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Economies of Scale and Scope in Australian
Telecommunications
HARRY BLOCH, GARY MADDEN? and SCOTT J. SAVAGE
Communications Economics Research Program, School of Economics and Finance, Curtin
University of Technology, Perth, Australia
Abstract. This paper employs a composite cost function to examine the cost structure of Australian
telephone services. The composite cost model combines the log-quadratic input price structure of the
translog model with a quadratic structure for multiple outputs. Quadratic output structures permit the
measurement of economies of scale, economies of scope, and subadditivity without prejudging their
presence. Model estimates, on Telstra system data from 1926 to 1991, show that the production of
Australian telephone services exhibits economies of scope but no ray economies of scale.
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I. Introduction
Since the early part of this century the telephone industry has been organised as a
natural monopoly under the assumption that its cost structure is subadditive. When
a firm’s cost function is subadditive (for given input prices) it can produce an arbit-
rary output vector more cheaply than any two firms faced with same cost function
(Baumol and Braunstein, 1977). Subaddivity can arise from economies of scale
and/or economies of scope. However, economies of scale are neither necessary nor
sufficient for subadditivity, while economies of scope are necessary. Economies of
scale exist when the marginal costs of production are less than ray average cost
over the relevant output range. Economies of scope exist when common facilities
make the production of a combination of goods less expensive then producing them
separately. As single firm production is the more cost effective in producing any
output mix, monopolistic firms are usually subject to price and entry regulation in
an attempt to achieve competitive outcomes (Berg and Tschirhart, 1995).
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Received telecommunications cost studies typically employ the translog cost
function when examining economies of scale and scope. The translog model places
no a priori restrictions on substitution possibilities among production inputs, and
allows scale economies to vary with the level of output (Christensen and Greene,
1976). A criticism of the translog function is its poor global approximation ability,
especially when the true cost structure is different from the Cobb–Douglas form
(not surprising since the translog pivots off the Cobb–Douglas). Röller (1990a)
argues that complex multiproduct cost properties, such as economies of scope or
subadditivity, should not be modeled with a translog function. The cost function is
degenerate at zero output levels.1
Pulley and Braunstein (1992) propose an alternative model for the indirect cost
function of multiproduct technology. The composite cost function combines the
log-quadratic input price structure of the translog model with a quadratic structure
for multiple outputs. Further, the model is easily constrained to be linear homogen-
eous in input prices, and does not impose separability or other restrictions. Baumol
et al. (1988) recommend the quadratic output structure for its ability to measure
economies of scope, product-specific economies of scale and subadditivity without
prejudging their presence.
This paper examines the Australian telecommunications cost structure for the
period 1926 through 1991. A composite cost function is estimated and empirical
testing for economies of scale and scope is performed. The paper is organised as
follows. Section II describes the data and econometric model used to estimate the
multi-product composite cost function. Estimation results are reported in Section
III, and an empirically tractable test for local subadditivity is presented in Section
IV. Concluding remarks are provided in Section V.
II. Econometric Model and Data
Econometric studies of telecommunications costs either aggregate services into
a single measure of output (and estimate single-product cost functions) or enter
outputs separately into a cost function. Baumol et al. (1988) argue that using a
multiproduct cost function is appropriate, as employing a weighted single measure
of output Y D 6iaiyi implicitly requires C.y1, . . . , ym/ D C.Y / D C.6iaiyI /.
This restriction on the functional form of the cost function is unlikely to be met,
and so must induce bias.
Estimation with separate outputs involves the specification of a composite cost
function.2 This can be used to measure the costs of specialised production, as is
1 It is not the estimated price effects that deteriorate away from the approximation point, but rather
the estimates of the output effects (Diewert and Wales, 1991).
2 The ability to model cost behaviour in the range of zero outputs gives it an advantage over
the translog and generalised translog forms. And by not imposing separability, the composite cost
function improves upon the CES-Quadratic form of Röller (1990b).
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required for estimating economies of scope. The composite cost function is written
as:
lnC D lnT0 C iqI C 126i6jij qiqi C6i0iT qi C81T C
1
2
82T
2
C6i6KiKqi ln rK U C6KK ln rK C 126K6LKL ln rK ln rL
C6KK ln T ln rK C T 75; (1)
where qi .i D 1, . . . , m/ refers to outputs, rK .K D 1, . . . , n/ refers to input
prices, and T is technology change. To account for the 1975 separation of the
Postmaster-General’s Department (PMG) into Australia Post and Telecom Aus-
tralia, respectively, T 75 equals one for t > 1975, and zero otherwise. All variables
are divided by their respective sample means.
By Shephard’s Lemma xn D @c=@rn, Where xn is the input demand for the nth
factor. The cost share equations (Sn D rnxn=C) corresponding to (1) are:
Sn D T0 C6iiqi C 126i6jiqiqj C6i0iT qi C81T
C1
2
82T
2 C 6i6KiKqi ln rK U−1
C6iinqi C n C6KKn ln rK CK ln T ; (2)
where n D K, L. The input price homogeneity (of degree one) restrictions are
6KK D 1, 6KKL D 0, 6KiK D 0, 6K K D 0. Symmetry restrictions are
ij D ji and KL D LK .
Annual data on costs, input prices, and output quantities are obtained from the
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Australia Post, PMG, and Telecom Australia
annual reports. Long-run cost (C) is the total cost of producing telephone services.
Telecommunications services are measured by millions of local (qLO) and toll
(long-distance) calls (qT ).3 Productive factors are labour and capital. The price
of labour (wL) is total salary expense divided by the number of employees. Capital
price (wK ) is calculated from residual expenses (total cost less labour expenses),
divided by mainlines. Exogenous technical change is measured by a time trend.4
Summary statistics are provided in Table I.
3 We acknowledge non-core outputs such as directory assistance, however, such services make
up a relatively small share of total revenue.
4 The cost function specification can use several measures of technical change. Endogenous meas-
ures, such as the percentage of telephones with access to direct dial facilities, and the percentage of
mainlines connected to automatic exchanges can be included in the cost model in output-augmenting
form. Denny et al. (1981) suggest that the introduction of direct dial facilities (such as STD) in-
fluences the provision of toll services, whilst the introduction of modern switching facilities at
central exchange offices has its major impact on the provision of local services. The effect of such
innovations is to reduce the cost of providing a given level of service, but the impact is service
specific.
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Table I. Summary statistics
Mean Std. dev. Max Min
Cost ($m) C 1100 2017 7906 13
Local calls (m) qLO 2448 2437 9446 300
Toll calls (m) qT 311 462 1832 23
Labour price ($) wL 5991 8737 32163 384
Capital price ($) wK 105 169 647 6.60
Capital share SK 0.34 0.13 0.66 0.16
Labour share SL 0.66 0.13 0.84 0.34
III. Econometric Result
The cost function and the labour share equation are jointly estimated by a non-
linear seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) technique using annual
data from 1926 to 1991. Since the factor shares sum to one, the capital share
equation is deleted to obtain a nonsingular covariance matrix. Model estimation
allows for first-order autocorrelation in each equation. SURE estimation results are
reported in Table II.
Of the 16 estimated coefficients, ten are significant at the five percent level. The
first-order terms for the independent variables, with the exception of toll output, are
significant at the 1% level. The estimated coefficients for labour price and local out-
put are positive and of plausible magnitude. The second-order output coefficients
are not extraordinarily large. These estimates contrast with those of Evans and
Heckman (1984), Charnes et al. (1988), Bloch et al. (1998) and Serafica (1998),
which have absolute values in the range of four to ten. Large second-order output
elasticities imply a percent increase in output causes an implausibly large change
in the output cost elasticity, and suggest inferences of economies of scale and scope
must be fragile (Shin and Ying, 1992; Braunstein and Pulley, 1998). Further, the
time-local output negative interaction term suggests that technology reduces the
cost of local calling.
For labour input price, the cost elasticity or factor share is positive, with a plaus-
ible magnitude. The labour input share is 0.66. The interaction term of labour price
with time reveals a tendency for the labour share to decrease over time (technology
is labour saving). The technology variable (time trend) is negative or cost saving,
and highly significant at −0.9715. The positive second-order parameter indicates
that these gains diminish through time. Finally, the dummy variable (T 75), denot-
ing the 1975 separation of the PMG into Australia Post and Telecom Australia,
has a negative coefficient, which suggests the separation resulted in lower costs of
telephony provision.
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Table II. Estimation results
Variable Parameter t-ratio
Constant 1.383 7.585
Local 1.165 4.077
Toll 0.087 0.331
Local  local 1.532 1.149
Toll  toll 0.280 0.725
Local  toll 0.093 0.136
Technology  local −1.919 −2.560
Technology  toll −0.047 −0.107
Technology −0.972 −4.438
Technology  technology 3.661 6.279
Local  labour price 0.076 2.691
Toll  labour price 0.021 1.162
Labour price 0.690 25.202
Labour price  labour price 0.181 21.306
Technology  labour price −0.063 −6.265
T 75 −0.024 −2.878
Log-likelihood 384.118
Cost function R2 0.9998
Labour share R2 0.9959
IV. Economies of Scale and Scope
Before discussing economies of scale and scope, the regularity conditions for the
estimated composite cost function are considered. Linear homogeneity in input
prices and symmetry are imposed a priori during estimation, whilst continuity
follows from the functional form. Since exp.ln.C.q/// is strictly positive for all
q, the estimated production costs are positive for all q. The marginal cost with
respect to outputs are nonnegative, and the costs of production are nondecreasing
in input price. By assumption, the input price is strictly positive, and output is
strictly positive. The first-order partial derivative of the estimated composite cost
function is positive when:
@ lnC=@ ln qi D i C6jij ln qj C 0I ln T C6KiK ln rK  0 for all i (3)
and
@ lnC=@ ln rk D K C 6KKL ln rK CK ln T C6iiK ln qi  0 for allK: (4)
Substitution of cost function estimates and sample observations into (3) and (4),
respectively, reveals that none of the 66 observations have negative marginal costs
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and costs are increasing with input prices. The final regularity condition is that the
cost function is concave in input prices. Following Diewert and Wales (1987), we
show that the cost function is concave in input prices since the matrix:
0.q/ 

LL − SL.1− SL/ LK C SLSK
KL − SKSL/ KK − SK.1− SK/

; (5)
is negative definite (where  indicates the estimated cost shares). By satisfying the
above conditions, the cost function is proper according to Röller (1990b).
Baumol (1977) and Baumol and Braunstein (1977) show a cost function is
strictly subadditive at output vector q when the function exhibits strictly declining
ray-average costs (RAC) for q  q, and is trans-ray convex (TRC) along at
least one cross-section through q. RACs are strictly declining at q (implying
ray economies of scale) when:
@C.tq; r/=@t < .C.tq; r/; (6)
where t = 1. The estimated composite cost function exhibits strictly declining
RACs when:
RAC D 0 C8T C 12T
2 − 1
2
6i6jij qiqj > 0 for all q  q: (7)
A cost function is TRC convex through q when there exists one trans-ray cross-
section through q along which the cost function is convex. For the two output case,
trans-ray convexity can be examined by considering the locus q2 D −aq1Cb, with
a > 0.
Following this substitution, trans-ray convexity is implied by:
@2C.q1;−aq1 C b; r/=@q21 > 0; (8)
for a > 0. The composite cost function will be TRC along one cross-section
through q when:
TRC D 11 − 212a C 22a2 > 0 for some a > 0: (9)
As noted by Braunstein and Pulley (1998) the TRC condition depends only on the
estimated coefficients and an arbitrary positive parameter. As such, it is possible
to examine the TRC condition globally. The RAC condition, however, depends on
values of the variables and coefficient estimates, and cannot be established globally.
To implement an empirically tractable test for economies of scale, RAC behaviour
is simulated over three different output paths from the actual output values in a
given year. Along path q1, both qLO and qT are scaled down to zero in 0.1 incre-
ments. Along paths q2 and q3, one of the outputs is fixed at its actual value and the
other output is scaled down to zero.
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Table III. Economies of scale and scope simulations, 1959
q1 D .LOqLO; T qT / q2 D .LOqLO; T qT / q3 D .LOqLO; T qT /
.LO; T / RAC .LO; T / RAC .LO; T / RAC
condition condition condition
(1.0, 1.0) −1474733 (1.0, 1.0) −1474733 (1.0, 1.0) −1474733
(0.9, 0.9) −1194149 (1.0, 0.9) −1195981 (0.9, 1.0) −1472742
(0.8, 0.8) −943101 (1.0, 0.8) −946405 (0.8, 1.0) −1470794
(0.7, 0.7) −721587 (1.0, 0.7) −726005 (0.7, 1.0) −1468889
(0.6, 0.6) −529609 (1.0, 0.6) −534780 (0.6, 1.0) −1467026
(0.5, 0.5) −367166 (1.0, 0.5) −372730 (0.5, 1.0) −1465206
(0.4, 0.4) −234258 (1.0, 0.4) −239855 (0.4, 1.0) −1463429
(0.3, 0.3) −130885 (1.0, 0.3) −136157 (0.3, 1.0) −1461694
(0.2, 0.2) −57047 (1.0, 0.2) −61633 (0.2, 1.0) −1460003
(0.1, 0.1) −12744 (1.0, 0.1) −16285 (0.1, 1.0) −1458354
(0.0, 0.0) (1.0, 0.0) −112 (0.0, 1.0) −1456747
TRC condition at a = 1 is 1.63
Table IV. Economies of scale and scope simulations, 1991
q1 D .LOqLO; T qT / q2 D .LOqLO; T qT / q3 D .LOqLO; T qT /
.LO; T / RAC .LO; T / RAC .LO; T / RAC
condition condition condition
(1.0, 1.0) −70279880 (1.0, 1.0) −70279880 (1.0, 1.0) −70279880
(0.9, 0.9) −56925200 (1.0, 0.9) −57154701 (0.9, 1.0) −70034803
(0.8, 0.8) −44976276 (1.0, 0.8) −45394722 (0.8, 1.0) −69799126
(0.7, 0.7) −34433108 (1.0, 0.7) −34999944 (0.7, 1.0) −69572849
(0.6, 0.6) −25295695 (1.0, 0.6) −25970366 (0.6, 1.0) −69355973
(0.5, 0.5) −17564038 (1.0, 0.5) −18305989 (0.5, 1.0) −69148497
(0.4, 0.4) −11238137 (1.0, 0.4) −12006813 (0.4, 1.0) −68950422
(0.3, 0.3) −6317992 (1.0, 0.3) −7072838 (0.3, 1.0) −68761748
(0.2, 0.2) −2803603 (1.0, 0.2) −3504063 (0.2, 1.0) −68582474
(0.1, 0.1) −694969 (1.0, 0.1) −1300490 (0.1, 1.0) −68412600
(0.0, 0.0) (1.0, 0.0) −462116 (0.0, 1.0) −68252127
TRC condition at a = 1 is 1.63
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Tables III and IV report RAC and TRC simulations for economies of scale and
scope where the declining RAC condition is evaluated at 1959 (the midpoint of
the sample) and 1991, respectively. The TRC condition is calculated for a D 1.
A negative value indicates that (7) fails to hold and the composite function does
not exhibit ray economies of scale (does not possess declining ray average costs).
However, condition (9) holds and the production of Australian telephone services
exhibits economies of scope.
Conclusions
This paper examines the Australian telecommunications sector from 1926 through
1991. Cost function specifications are described, as are tests for natural monopoly.
Econometric results reported herein indicate that the cost structure for Australian
telephone services was not subadditive over the sample period.
Thus, there is evidence to support having a monopoly supplier of telephone calls
in Australia up to 1991. It remains to be determined whether this rationale has con-
tinued into the post-1992 period, when the Australian government allowed entry
into the provision of local and toll telephone calls. Further, research on subsequent
data is required to answer this question.
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